



## IMPACT OF INSURGENCY ON INCOME OF FARMERS IN NORTHEASTERN NIGERIA

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### *Abstract*

*This study was designed to analyze the impact of insurgency on income of farmers in northeastern Nigeria. The specific objectives were to: examine the nature and frequency of insurgency, examine the perceptions of the farmers on the causes of insurgency and analyze the impact of insurgency on income of farmers. Findings revealed that 45.62 percent of respondents stated sporadic shooting as the most prevalent form of insurgent attacks with women being the most victims (51.85%), while respondent averagely experienced arson once, sporadic shooting twice, kidnapping once, suicide bombing thrice, bombing with improvised devices twice, forced recruitment once and threats 10 times. All the respondents (100%) are in support that unemployment is a major cause of insurgency and about 90 percent of the respondents are in support that poverty is a major cause of insurgency. The F-chow value estimate (92.59<sup>\*\*\*</sup>) for income was statistically significant at 1 percent level of probability; meaning that insurgent activities had an impact on income. The study recommended that women should be trained for self defense so they can tactically defend themselves during insurgent and other forms of attacks. It was also recommended that government, international or local NGOs, private organization and rich individuals should intensify efforts in economically empowering people in the study area.*

**Key words:** Insurgency, poverty, unemployment, income, empowering

### INTRODUCTION

The northern part of Nigeria has for years witnessed several violent clashes that have claimed lives and property worth billions of Naira and, no doubt, have resulted in dislocation of people and turning them into internally displaced people (IDPs) living in IDP camps (Akeem, 2010). Among all forms of violence in recent history of Nigeria, the Boko Haram (BH) insurgency activities have most severe



impact. According to Powell and Abraham (2006) insurgency refers to a violent move by a person or group of persons to resist or oppose the enforcement of law or running of government or revolt against constituted authority of the state or of taking part in insurrection. According to Kilcullen (2006) insurgency is a struggle to control a contested political space, between a state or a group of states or occupying powers, and one or more popularly based non-state challengers.

The complexity of Nigeria as a nation is centered on its unifying political formation but diverse economic, social and religious inclinations. As a nation, the country since independence has experienced several ethnic and religious crisis of various degrees and magnitude (Gilbert, 2013). The Boko Haram insurgency in the North-east geopolitical zone of Nigeria that originally took the form of sectarian religious violence escalated into terrorist activities with international linkages and affiliations making it a relatively difficult nut for the Nigerian government to crack (Gilbert, 2014). The understanding of Nigerians on insurgency is multidimensional and there are different reactions of Nigerians to the real identity and motive of Boko Haram sect. Most Muslims liken it to Maitatsine sect which was established in 1945 to bring turmoil to Islam as it was confirmed that Maitatsine was not a Muslim until his death. A reasonable number of Christians see it as an attempt to islamize Nigerians while some are indifferent (Shehu, 2014).

The emergence of the fundamentalist Islamic sect, has led to the flight for safety and security of most Nigerians residing in the north east, especially Christians (Nwakaudu, 2012). The terrorists have adopted several methods to unleash terror on the people such as: arson, mass killing by gunfire, suicide bombing, use of improvised explosives, high-jacking of aircrafts and ships, hostage-taking (kidnapping), media propaganda and advocacy, piracy , jail break and forced enlistment/ recruitment of combatant (Okoli and Iortyer, 2014).

Rural livelihoods are composed of the activities that generate the means of household survival and longer-term well-being. Livelihood may be divided into natural resource based activities (e.g. cultivation and livestock-keeping) and non-natural resource based activities (e.g. trade.) (Ellis, 2000). However, livelihood outcomes and goals vary and they are subject to changes. For example, in peaceful and politically stable situations, livelihood goals might include increased well-being or more income; whereas in times of crisis, people's goals might become focused on such short-term objectives as personal safety, food security, reduced vulnerability and survival (UNDP, 1998). The impact of insurgency on agriculture which is a major source of income for most of these rural dwellers cannot be overemphasized as the fears of death in recent times have limited their participation in agriculture. The ongoing insurgency in the northeastern region of Nigeria poses serious threats not only on the lives of individuals, but also to their income sources. It is against this backdrop that this research seeks to critically assess the impact of insurgency activities on income of farmers in northeastern Nigeria.

The gloomy consequences of the nefarious activities of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria and the destruction of lives and properties are a serious issue that cannot be dismissed with a wave of hand. The incessant bombing by these insurgents no doubt imparts negatively on agricultural activities as most farmers in areas of attacks hardly go to farms and should therefore be an area people should research into for possible solutions, but unfortunately, there is dearth of



empirical and quantitative evaluation of the catastrophic damage insurgency activities have done to the income of rural dwellers particularly on agricultural production which is their major source of income. As such, there is presently no in-depth and scholarly study on the impact of insurgency activities on income of farmers in northeastern Nigeria.

With farmers being afraid to go to their fields in Borno and Yobe States, rains that exceeded expectations failed to translate into a better harvest because most farmers were scared of being ambushed on the way to their farms. The fear of being ambushed made many farmers avoid going to distant farms and also limited the frequency of visits to their farms. Even where farmers are still able to produce, they face difficulties moving their harvest to the towns and cities where they are in demand because transport infrastructures have been sabotaged by militants, and vehicles traveling on remote roads risk being ambushed. The ban on motorbikes which is a means of transportation for these rural dwellers has greatly limited the accessibility of their agricultural produce to markets and this has reduced the quantity of agricultural produce within Nigeria and also of that exported to other countries.

The aim of the study is to analyze insurgency on livelihood of farmers in northeastern Nigeria. The specific objectives are to: examine the nature and frequency of insurgency in the study area;

examine the perceptions of the farmers on causes of insurgency in the study area, and analyze the impact of insurgency on income of farmers in the study area.

#### **RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS OF THE STUDY**

**H<sub>01</sub>:** There is no significant relationship between insurgency and income of farmers.

#### **STUDY AREA**

The study was conducted in four local government areas (LGAs) of northeastern Nigeria, namely: Gaidam LGA in Yobe state, which has its headquarters in Gaidam Town, with an area of 4,311km<sup>2</sup> and a 2015 projected population of 208,849 from the 2006 population census figure of 157,295 (NPC, 2007); Gujba LGA in Yobe state, which has its headquarters in Buni Yadi, with an area of 3,871km<sup>2</sup> and a 2015 projected population of 172,725 from the 2006 population census figure of 130,088; Magumari LGA in Borno state, which has its headquarters in Magumari Town, with an area of 4,856km<sup>2</sup> and a 2015 projected population of 186,192 from the 2006 population census figure of 140,231, and Gubio LGA in Borno state, which has its headquarters in Gubio Town, with an area of 2,464 km<sup>2</sup> and a 2015 projected population of 202,851 from the 2006 population census figure of 152,778; (NPC, 2007).

Yobe State is located between Latitudes 11° 45'N - 13° 30'N of the Equator and Longitudes 9° 30'E - 12° 30'E of the Greenwich meridian and it shares borders with three States; to the eastern boundary is Borno State, to the west is Jigawa and Bauchi States while to the north is international border with Niger Republic (Chinedu and Olaolu, 2010). Borno State lies between Latitudes 10° and 14° N, and Longitudes 11°30' and 14°45' E. The State occupies the greatest part of the Chad Basin and shares borders with the Republics of Niger to the North, Chad to the North-East and Cameroon to the East. Within the country, its neighbours are Adamawa to the South, Yobe to the West and Gombe to the



South-West (Ijere and Daura, 2000); figure 1 below shows the areas and states of study and the countries bordering these states.

Yobe State has hot and dry climatic features in the northern part for most of the year. In the southern part, especially in the rocky area of Gujba and Fika local government areas, it is hot between the months of March and June and cooler for most part of the year. The hottest months are March, April and May with temperatures ranging from 39°C - 42°C. The period of rainy season in the State varies from place to place, but generally lasts for about 120 days in the north and more than 140 days in the south. Annual rainfall ranges from 500mm-1000m and the rainy season is normally from June to September in the North and May to October in the South (Ali, Brian, Richard and Peter, 2014). Borno State is hot and dry for the greater part of the year, although the southern part is slightly milder. It has an annual mean minimum temperature of 21.7°C and an annual mean maximum temperature of 36.0°C (NBS, 2012). The majority of the State is however in the Sahel and Sudan Savanna where rainfall is limited. The rains start with some showers in June, stabilize in July and ends in September. Typically rainfall ranged from about 900 mm in the southern part of the state to about 450 in the northern parts (Women Farmers Advancement Network (WOFAN), 2007).

The geology of Yobe principally comprises crystalline and sedimentary rocks, underlain by basement complex rocks. The crystalline rocks are represented by older granites found in pockets of places in the southern part of the state. Another crystalline rock formation of younger age is located in the northwestern tip of the state in the Machina area. The older granite is Pre cambrian in origin consisting of metamorphic structures of gneiss and amphibolites. The younger granitic rocks are of Jurassic period, deposited between 195 and 135 million years before the present (Jalo, 2015). A greater part of the Borno State lies on the Chad Formation. This is an area that was subjected to prolonged continental and lake sedimentation as a result of the downwarp of the Chad Basin in the Pleistocene Period. The Chad Formation is separated by Cretaceous Bima and Kerri sandstones. The volcanic areas of the Biu Plateau and the Basement Complex areas of the Mandra Mountains are found in the south and southeast, respectively (Ijere and Daura, 2000).




Figure 1: Borno and Yobe States Showing the Study Areas  
Source: Adapted From Administrative Map of Nigeria



## MATERIAL AND METHODS

The study made use of primary and secondary sources of data. Multi-stage sampling technique was employed in selecting the respondents for this study. In the first stage, out of all the Northeastern States in Nigeria, Borno and Yobe were purposively selected because these are the two most affected states by the insurgency activities. In the second stage, out of the 17 LGAs and 27 LGAs in Yobe and Borno State respectively, four LGAs were purposively selected from the two States; Gaidam and Gujba from Yobe and Magumari and Gubio from Borno. These LGAs were selected not just because they were affected by the insurgency, but because they are most accessible for questionnaire administration. In the third stage, a total of four villages were purposively selected; one village from each Local Government Area. These villages were selected on the fact that they were affected by the insurgency and are most accessible for data collection. In the fourth stage, the systematic random sampling technique was employed in selecting respondents from these villages so as to avoid being bias.

Yamane (1967) formula was used to calculate the sample size with 95% confidence level and 5% sampling error assumption.

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where,

n= Sample size (Total sample size)

N= Population size (Total sample frame)

e= Level of significance (set at 0.05 for this study)

To determine further the proportion of the respondents (sample size per village), Yamane (1967) sampling method for determining of respondents was also used, ie

$$\text{Sample size of village} = \frac{\text{Sample frame of village} \times \text{Total Sample Size of all villages}}{\text{Total sample frame of all villages}}$$

Table 1 shows the states, LGAs, sample frames and the sample sizes derived from the sample frames using the Yamane formula. Villages that were attacked and were most accessible were the ones data were collected from; the villages are Magumari, Gubio, Geidam and Buni-Gari.



**Table 1: Population and Sample Size of Farmers**

State	LGAs	Villages	Sample frame**	Sample size
Borno	Magumari	Magumari*** Gajeganna* Furam* Yasku* Zumtur* Ngamma*	800	95
	Gubio	Gubio*** Karauwa* Moleram* Kanguri* Isaram* Musari*	1000	118
Yobe	Geidam	Geidam*** Funchimeram* Balle* Kellor*i Gumsa*	700	83
	Gujba	Buni-Gari*** Buni-Yadi* Goneri* Katarko* Ambiya*	485	57
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2985</b>	<b>353</b>

\*\*Source: Field work, (2016).

\*\*\* Insurgency affected communities in which data were collected from because they were most accessible

\* Insurgency affected communities that were not accessible

Descriptive statistics were used to examine the nature and frequency of insurgency and the perception of farmers on causes of insurgency, while the Chow test was used to determine the impact of insurgency on income of farmers. The formula is specified as follow:

$$F = \frac{(RSSR - SSR1 - SSR2)/ k}{(SSR1 + SSR2)/ n - 2k}$$

**Source:** Mohammad, (2014).

Where;

F= F-statistic

RSSR = the sum of squared residuals from a linear regression in which income of farmers before and during the insurgency activities are assumed to be the same, the income has dimension k, and there are n observations in total.

SSR<sub>1</sub> = the sum of squared residuals from a linear regression of income of sample one.

SSR<sub>2</sub> = the sum of squared residuals from a linear regression of income of sample two.



The total number of observation is  $n = n_1 + n_2$  and the number of parameters is  $k$ .

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### Nature and Frequency of Insurgency Encountered by Respondents

Table 2 shows the nature or form of the most common attacks by the terrorists in the study area; this was categorized into seven groups such as arson, sporadic shooting, kidnapping, suicide bombing, bombing with improvised devices, forced recruitment and threats. Of all the forms of attacks observed among the respondents according to the pooled data, sporadic shooting (45.62%) was the most prevalent one followed by arson (30.54%) and bombing with improvised devices (13.41%) while the least common nature of the attacks was through kidnapping. More proportion of females in the study area were victims of sporadic shooting, threats and bombing with improvised devices than their male counterparts, but in terms of other forms of attacks, we have more proportion of males as victims. This totally agrees with Okoli and Iortyer (2014) who in their finding reported that terrorists globally have adopted the following as means of executing their diabolical designs: arson, mass killing by gunfire, suicide bombing, use of improvised explosives, high-jacking of aircrafts and ships, hostage-taking (kidnapping), media propaganda and advocacy, piracy, jail break and forced enlistment/recruitment of combatant.

The frequency of the attacks by the terrorists deferred from one form of attack to another with important variation among the respondents. According to the pooled data, a respondent averagely experienced arson once, sporadic shooting twice, kidnapping once, suicide bombing thrice, bombing with improvised devices twice, forced recruitment once and threats 10 times. The least affected respondent experienced all the forms of attacks once except threats which were experienced twice. The most affected respondent by insurgency experienced arson thrice, sporadic shooting 11 times, kidnapping thrice, suicide bombing 6 times, bombing with improvised devices 4 times, forced recruitment thrice and threats 15 times.

Table 2: Nature and frequency distribution of insurgency based on sex

Variable	Female (n1=35)	Male (n2=294)	Pooled (n=329)
<b>Nature of insurgency</b>			
Arson	11 (20.37)	153 (31.68)	164 (30.54)
Sporadic shooting	28 (51.85)	217 (44.93)	245 (45.62)
Kidnapping	0	2 (0.41)	2 (0.37)
Suicide bombing	4 (7.41)	36 (7.45)	40 (7.45)
Bombing with improvised explosive devices	8 (14.81)	64 (13.25)	72 (13.41)
Forced Recruitment	0	7 (1.45)	7 (1.3)
Threats	3 (5.56)	4 (0.83)	7 (1.3)
<b>Average number of occurrences</b>			
Arson	1 (0)	1.18 (0.5)	1.17 (0.48)





Min	1	1	1
Max	1	3	3
Sporadic shooting	2.93 (2.81)	2.16 (1.86)	2.25 (2.01)
Min	1	1	1
Max	10	11	11
Kidnapping	0	1.42 (0.84)	1.38 (0.8)
Min	0	1	1
Max	0	3	3
Suicide bombing	3.25 (0.5)	2.83 (1.44)	2.87 (1.38)
Min	3	1	1
Max	4	6	6
Bombing with improvised devices	1.86 (1.25)	1.59 (1.1)	1.63 (1.11)
Min	1	1	1
Max	4	4	4
Forced Recruitment	0	1.33 (0.82)	1.33 (0.82)
Min	0	1	1
Max	0	3	3
Threats	1(0)	10.67 (7.5)	9.67 (5.5)
Min	1	2	2
Max	1	700	700

Source: Author's estimates from survey data (2016)

Percentages and standard deviations in parentheses for discrete and continuous data respectively.

### Farmers' perception on the causes of insurgency

The causes of insurgency were considered in terms of individual causes and joint or simultaneous causes of insurgency. According to Table 3 on an individual basis, all the respondents (100%) are in support (agree and strongly agree) that unemployment is a cause of insurgency; 89.97 percent of the respondents are in support (agree and strongly agree) that poverty is a cause of insurgency; 59.88 percent of the respondents are in support (agree and strongly agree) that ignorance is a cause of poverty; 13.07 percent of the farmers are in support (agree and strongly agree) that religious bigotry is a cause of insurgency and 45.59 percent of the farmers are in support (agree or strongly agree) that loosed borders is a cause of insurgency. According to Joseph (2015) the current insurgency in the North is worsened by the high level of poverty, unemployment and illiteracy prevalent in northern Nigeria. The finding of this work strongly agrees with the work of Joheph and also with Folarin and Oviasogie (2015) who lamented and stated in their work that Nigeria is ravaged by underdevelopment, unemployment, illiteracy and poverty; all of which have instigated grievances against the system and created breeding ground for terrorism.

In terms of joint causes of insurgency; that is, by jointly considering that unemployment, poverty, ignorance, religious bigotry and loose borders as jointly causing insurgency, it was observed that the 46.81 percent of the respondents are indifferent as of whether unemployment, poverty, ignorance,



religious bigotry and loose borders jointly cause insurgency. Also, 43.46 percent of the respondents believe that unemployment, poverty, ignorance, religious bigotry and loose borders are joint causes of insurgency while only 9.73 percent of the respondents don't believe (disagree and strongly disagree) that unemployment, poverty, ignorance, religious bigotry and loose borders are joint causes of insurgency.

Table 3: Frequency distribution of farmers' perception on causes of insurgency

Cause	SD	D	I	A	SA
<b>Individual cause</b>					
Unemployment	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	92 (28.00)	237 (72.00)
Poverty	0 (0)	0 (0)	33 (10.03)	156 (47.42)	140 (42.55)
Ignorance	0 (0)	67 (20.36)	65 (19.76)	98 (29.79)	99 (30.09)
Religious bigotry	238 (72.34)	44 (13.37)	4 (1.22)	40 (12.16)	3 (0.91)
Loosed borders	0 (0)	18 (5.47)	161 (48.94)	110 (33.43)	40 (12.16)
<b>Joint cause</b>					
	14 (4.26)	18 (5.47)	154 (46.81)	103 (31.31)	40 (12.15)

Source: Author's estimates

Percentage in parentheses. SD = Strongly Disagree, D=Disagree, I = Indifferent, A=Agree, SA= Strongly Agree

### Impact of Insurgency on Income of Farmers

The analysis of the impact of insurgency on income as presented in Table 4 shows that there is great variation in income residuals across the three models (pooled data, 2009 data and 2015 data). The F-chow value estimates was 92.59 which was statistically significant at 1 percent level of probability. The implication is that parameters' estimates of the conditional mean of income differ across 2009 and 2015 which technically suggests that there was instability in income across 2009 and 2015. Thus, it can be said that insurgent activities have had an impact on income. This finding totally agrees with Salkida (2012) who stated in his work that insurgency in the north has had a devastating effect on families and livelihood of many economic groups which has resulted to the bringing down of incomes and increasing poverty levels.



Table 4: Chows test estimates of the impact of insurgency on income among farmers in the study area

Source of residual variation	SS	Rdf	F-show
<b>Income</b>			92.59***
RSS due to pooled data	169,111,978,181.30	568	
RSS due to 2009 data	43,932,087,023.17	287	
RSS due to 2015 data	40,659,205,321.74	275	
RSS due to unrestricted model	84,591,292,344.92	556	
RSS due to restricted model	169,111,978,181.30	568	

The impact of insurgency on farmers' income was tested and the F-calculated as seen in Table 5 was found to be greater than the F-tabulated and statistically significant at one percent level of probability, so the null hypothesis that 'there is no significant impact of insurgency on income of farmers was rejected'; meaning that, insurgency has a significant impact on farmers' income in the study area.

Table 5: Test of significance of the impact of insurgency on farmers' income

Hypothesis	Test-statistic	F-calculated	F-tabulated
$H_{01}$	F-test	92.59***	2.83

Source: Author's estimates from survey data (2016)

\*\*\*<0.05.  $H_{01}$ =there is no significant impact of insurgency on income.

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Conclusion

On the basis of the findings of the study, it has been possible to establish the fact that sporadic shooting was the most prevalent form of all insurgent attacks with women being the most victims. Unemployment and poverty were the two major causes of insurgency as they were being established in the finding of this study. Also established in this study was the fact that insurgent activities had an impact on income of the farmers. The hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between insurgency and income was rejected.

It was discovered in this study that unemployment and poverty were the major causes of insurgency; it is therefore recommended that government, international or local NGOs, private organization and rich individuals should intensify efforts in economically empowering people in the study area. It was also revealed from this study that insurgency had an impact on the income of the respondents; it is therefore recommended that the government should locate victims of these attacks and compensate them so they can start life again. Furthermore, this study revealed that sporadic shooting was the most prevalent form of insurgent attack and women were most victims; it is therefore recommended that women should be trained for self defense so they can tactically defend themselves during insurgent and other forms of attacks.

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